

Message Text

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AMEMBASSY LONDON

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SUBJ:CCD - GUIDANCE FOR INFORMAL MEETINGS WITH EXPERTS

ON COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN (CTB)

1. OVERALL APPROACH OF US DEL IN INFORMAL MEETINGS SHOULD BE TO DEMONSTRATE CONTINUING US COMMITMENT TO ADEQUATELY-VERIFIED CTB AND US INTENTION TO WORK ACTIVELY AND COOPERATIVELY TOWARD OVERCOMING REMAINING OBSTACLES, WHILE MAKING EFFECTIVE CASE THAT SUBSTANTIAL VERIFICATION ISSUES MUST STILL BE RESOLVED BEFORE CTB OBJECTIVE CAN BE ACHIEVED. WHILE OTHER DELEGATIONS MAY WISH TO BROADEN DISCUSSIONS TO INCLUDE "POLITICAL OBSTACLES" TO CTB, SUCH AS POSSIBLE REQUIREMENT THAT ALL NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES PARTICIPATE, OR MAY ASSERT THAT CURRENT IMPASSE ON CTB CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO LACK OF SUFFICIENT POLITICAL WILL ON PART OF MAJOR TESTING POWERS, US DEL SHOULD TAKE POSITION THAT PRINCIPAL OBSTACLE TO CTB, AND THEREFORE APPROPRIATE FOCUS OF EXPERTS' ATTENTION, IS DIFFERENCE OF VIEW ON CRITICAL VERIFICATION MATTERS.

2. IN KEEPING WITH THIS APPROACH, US WILL PRESENT WORKING PAPER DEALING WITH CURRENT SEISMIC MONITORING CAPABILITIES AND REPORTING PROGRESS SINCE US 1973 WORKING PAPER. IN RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS DURING INFORMAL MEETINGS AND IN PRESENTING US SUMMARY OF INFORMAL MEETINGS IN PLENARY STATEMENT, DEL MAY DRAW ON MATERIAL CONTAINED IN WORKING PAPER AS WELL AS ON CLEARED Q'S AND A'S (PROVIDED SEPARATELY), PREVIOUS US STATEMENTS AND WORKING PAPERS (INCLUDING 1975 WORKING PAPER ON ARMS CONTROL IMPLICATIONS OF PNES), AND FOLLOWING PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF US CTB POSITION:

A. WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO THE OBJECTIVE OF AN ADEQUATELY-VERIFIED CTB AGREEMENT. IN THE ABSENCE OF RELIABLE, MUTUAL RESTRAINTS, WE BELIEVE OUR NUCLEAR TESTING PROGRAM SERVES AS AN IMPORTANT MEANS OF MAINTAINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR NUCLEAR DETERRENT. HOWEVER, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO GIVE UP WHATEVER BENEFITS EXIST IN CONTINUED TESTING IF THIS WERE DONE PURSUANT TO AN ADEQUATELY VERIFIED AGREEMENT THAT PROVIDED REASONABLE CONFIDENCE THAT OTHER PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT WERE ALSO GIVING UP THOSE BENEFITS.

B. ALTHOUGH IMPROVEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE IN SEISMIC VERIFICATION CAPABILITIES IN RECENT YEARS, WE BELIEVE THAT SIGNIFICANT LIMITATIONS REMAIN. BECAUSE OF THESE LIMITATIONS, WE DO NOT PRESENTLY FORESEE HOW A CTB VERIFICATION SYSTEM BASED SOLELY ON TELESEISMIC MEANS COULD PROVIDE

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ADEQUATE ASSURANCE THAT A PARTY WAS NOT CONDUCTING A CLANDESTINE TESTING PROGRAM OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE.

C. IN VIEW OF EXISTING LIMITATIONS OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION, WE BELIEVE THAT ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF A CTB CONTINUES TO REQUIRE SOME ON-SITE INSPECTION. IN MANY INSTANCES, ON-SITE INSPECTION WOULD BE THE ONLY MEANS OF PROVIDING CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE (E.G. THROUGH SAMPLING FOR RADIOACTIVITY) THAT A DETECTED SEISMIC EVENT

WAS A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION RATHER THAN AN EARTHQUAKE OR A CONVENTIONAL EXPLOSION. THUS, A VERIFICATION SYSTEM THAT INCLUDED ON-SITE INSPECTION WOULD NOT ONLY PROVIDE A SUBSTANTIAL DETERRENT TO CLANDESTINE TESTING BY INCREASING THE RISKS THAT ANY SIGNIFICANT VIOLATION WOULD BE DISCOVERED. IT WOULD ALSO PROVIDE A MEANS OF ASSURING CONFIDENCE IN THE TREATY REGIME IN THOSE CASES WHERE SEISMIC METHODS MAY HAVE MISIDENTIFIED EARTHQUAKES AS EXPLOSIONS OR PRESENTED AMBIGUOUS EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE NATURE OF A SEISMIC EVENT.

D. WE BELIEVE THAT UNMANNED SEISMIC OBSERVATORIES (USO) COULD MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO SEISMIC VERIFICATION OF A CTB, BUT THAT THEY ARE NOT THE EQUIVALENT OF, AND SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR, ON-SITE INSPECTION. FURTHER EFFORT SHOULD BE DEVOTED TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAMPER-PROOF, RELIABLE, LOW MAINTENANCE USO'S INVOLVING MINIMUM INTRUSIVENESS, AND TO EVALUATING THE POTENTIAL UTILITY OF SUCH INSTRUMENTS TO A CTB VERIFICATION SYSTEM.

E. WE CONTINUE TO REGARD INTERNATIONAL SEISMIC COOPERATION AS A PROMISING COMPONENT OF A CTB VERIFICATION SYSTEM. THE US HAS IN THE PAST MADE A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF SEISMIC INFORMATION AVAILABLE INTERNATIONALLY IN AN EFFORT TO PROMOTE GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF HOW SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE COULD CONTRIBUTE TO MONITORING A CTB. WE SUPPORT SWEDISH PROPOSAL THAT AN AD HOC GROUP OF EXPERTS BE ESTABLISHED TO STUDY INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, INCLUDING A MULTINATIONAL SEISMIC NETWORK, FOR SEISMIC VERIFICATION OF A CTB, ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT NECESSARILY ENDORSE THE IDEAS CONTAINED IN THE SWEDISH WORKING PAPER CONCERNING THE FORM THAT INTERNATIONAL SEISMIC COOPERATION MIGHT TAKE. IN ADDITION TO DISCUSSING HOW AN INTERNATIONAL SEISMIC NETWORK MIGHT OPERATE, EXPERTS' GROUP SHOULD CONSIDER EFFECTIVENESS OF SUCH A NETWORK IN MEETING VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.

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MENTS FOR A CTB, PARTICULARLY IN OVERCOMING EXISTING LIMITATIONS OF SEISMIC VERIFICATION CAPABILITIES.

F. IF PNES WERE TO BE ACCOMMODATED UNDER A CTB, A VERIFICATION SYSTEM WOULD HAVE TO BE DEvised THAT WOULD PROVIDE ADEQUATE ASSURANCE THAT WEAPON-RELATED BENEFITS WERE NOT BEING ACQUIRED FROM NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS CARRIED OUT OSTENSIBLY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. TO ACHIEVE THE LATTER OBJECTIVE, A CONTROL SYSTEM, AT A MINIMUM, WOULD HAVE TO PREVENT THE TESTING OF A NEW WEAPON CONCEPT, THE SUBSTITUTION OF A STOCKPILED WEAPON FOR THE "PNE" EXPLOSIVE TO VERIFY ITS PERFORMANCE, AND THE CARRYING OUT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS STUDIES. FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THIS DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX VERIFICATION PROBLEM IS REQUIRED. NO SATISFACTORY SOLUTION TO IT HAS YET BEEN FOUND.

G. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR A STATE NOT PREVIOUSLY POS-

SESSING A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY TO CARRY OUT NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES WITHOUT IN THE PROCESS ACQUIRING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY.

H. IN LIGHT OF THE SERIOUS SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING, THE QUESTION OF PARTICIPATION (I.E., WHETHER A CTB AGREEMENT WOULD REQUIRE ADHERENCE BY ALL NUCLEAR POWERS BEFORE ENTRY INTO FORCE) WOULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED IN CONSIDERING ANY CTB PROPOSAL. HOWEVER, WE QUESTION THE DESIRABILITY OF TAKING A POSITION ON THE PARTICIPATION ISSUE IN THE ABSTRACT, BEFORE THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS HOLDING UP A CTB -- NAMELY, VERIFICATION DIFFICULTIES, INCLUDING PNES -- ARE RESOLVED. AMONG THE FACTORS THAT WOULD PRESUMABLY BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN ARRIVING AT A POSITION ON THIS MATTER WOULD BE A TESTING STATE'S PERCEPTION OF ITS OWN NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES AND TESTING EXPERIENCE RELATIVE TO THE NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES AND TESTING EXPERIENCE OF OTHER TESTING POWERS. SUCH AN ASSESSMENT, IN OUR VIEW, WOULD MOST APPROPRIATELY BE MADE WHEN REMAINING VERIFICATION ISSUES ARE RESOLVED. AT THAT TIME, SEVERAL OPTIONS WOULD BE AVAILABLE, INCLUDING AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD ENTER INTO FORCE UPON THE ADHERENCE OF ALL NUCLEAR POWERS, A LIMITED DURATION AGREEMENT NOT REQUIRING ADHERENCE BY ALL NUCLEAR POWERS THAT WOULD PROVIDE FOR REVIEW AND EXTENSION, AND AN UNLIMITED DURATION AGREEMENT NOT REQUIRING ADHERENCE BY ALL NUCLEAR POWERS BUT CONTAINING A PROVISION FOR WITHDRAWAL IN THE EVENT THAT

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TREATY PARTIES CONSIDERED THEIR SUPREME INTERESTS TO BE JEOPARDIZED. FOR THESE REASONS, THE US HAS NOT MADE A DETERMINATION WHETHER A CTB SHOULD REQUIRE THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL NUCLEAR POWERS BEFORE IT COULD ENTER INTO FORCE.

3. WE WOULD EXPECT OTHER DELEGATIONS TO BE INTERESTED IN THE IMPLICATIONS FOR A CTB OF THE TTBT AND THE ACCOMPANYING PNE AGREEMENT RECENTLY CONCLUDED PURSUANT TO ARTICLE III OF TTBT. IN RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS ON TTBT, DEL SHOULD DRAW ON PREVIOUS USG STATEMENTS AND CLEARED Q'S AND A'S. IN RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS ON PNE AGREEMENT, DEL SHOULD DRAW ON PRESS GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN STATE 85462 (NOTAL) INDICATING THAT DEL IS NOT IN POSITION TO DISCUSS AGREEMENT SINCE IT IS STILL BEING REVIEWED IN CAPITALS. IN ADVANCE OF INFORMAL MEETINGS, DEL SHOULD CONSULT WITH SOVIET DEL ON HANDLING OF PNE AGREEMENT. IN THE EVENT THAT PNE AGREEMENT IS MADE PUBLIC PRIOR TO CONCLUSION OF INFORMAL MEETINGS, DEL WILL RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING TABLING OF TEXT. ROBINSON

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